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COMPLIANCE ELITES
Miriam H. Baer*
As corporate compliance has expanded its influence, so too has the status
of those who implement and oversee the firm’s compliance function. Chief
compliance officers (CCOs), who are often (but not exclusively) lawyers by
training, increasingly boast the types of resumes one associates with elite
lawyers. In many ways, this is good news for compliance. There may,
however, be several downsides to a strategy of relying so heavily on a cadre
of compliance elites. The aim of this Article is to discuss one of these
downsides.
High-performing lawyers nurture a potent, yet underexplored, cognitive
blind spot. Having performed extremely well under exacting and
hierarchical performance regimes earlier in their lives, these perpetual
“winners” may be less adept in identifying performance metrics that are
unduly severe or prone to induce cheating. Similarly, elite lawyers may be
more likely to discount, ex post, the red flags that arise when an employee or
organizational unit’s performance is just too good to be true. As compliance
matures, the challenge for its top personnel will be to recognize and address
these blind spots and hopefully learn from them.
This Article sets three goals: first, to highlight the emergence of a cadre
of elite lawyers within the compliance industry; second, to explore and
synthesize the positive aspects of this development; and third, to hypothesize
and draw attention to the drawbacks of focusing one’s hiring on the
compliance officer’s elite resume. The takeaway is not that firms should
eschew the advice of elite lawyers in compliance matters. Rather, it is to
pose the suggestion that top performers may not always be best at detecting
the misconduct risk generated by systems designed to measure and reward
workplace performance.

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. J.D., Harvard Law School; A.B., Princeton
University. This Article was prepared for the Colloquium on Corporate Lawyers, hosted by
the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics on October 11, 2019, at
Fordham University School of Law. The author thanks Professor Bruce Green for organizing
and inviting her to join this Colloquium, as well as all of its participants for their insightful
feedback on this piece. In addition, the author thanks Andrey Udalov, who provided excellent
research assistance on this piece, and the staff of the Fordham Law Review.
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INTRODUCTION
In mid-August 2019, Carnival Corporation, the well-known cruise
operator whose environmental violations extend at least as far back as the
1990s, announced with great fanfare the appointment of its inaugural chief
ethics and compliance officer.1 Peter Anderson, a former prosecutor with
twenty years’ relevant experience and a background in environmental
compliance, vowed to build a world-class compliance program and improve
Carnival’s reputation and internal culture.2 The company further announced
that Anderson would become a member of the company’s leadership team
and report directly to its chief executive officer (CEO), along with “dottedline reporting” to the company’s board of directors.3
For those who study compliance, Anderson’s hiring represents a positive
development, notwithstanding the series of scandals that preceded it.4 It
underscores the claim that publicly held companies can no longer openly
write off criminal liability as a mere cost of doing business. Compliance has
become an essential component of corporate governance.5 To repair systems
and prevent future ethical and legal failures, firms have either added the word
“compliance” to the chief legal officer’s title or have created separate chief
compliance officer (CCO) positions to coordinate, grow, and promote the
firm’s compliance function.6

1. Jaclyn Jaeger, Still Under Probation, Carnival Names Chief Ethics and Compliance
Officer, COMPLIANCE WK. (Aug. 12, 2019, 5:01 PM), https://www.complianceweek.com/
grapevine/still-under-probation-carnival-names-chief-ethics-and-complianceofficer/27559.article [https://perma.cc/2VNG-TS9L].
2. Id. For further detail on Carnival’s misconduct, which culminated in a $20 million
fine for several violations while the company was completing its probation, see Merrit
Kennedy & Greg Allen, Carnival Cruise Lines Hit with 20 Million Penalty for Environmental
Crimes, NPR (June 4, 2019, 2:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/04/729622653/carnivalcruise-lines-hit-with-20-million-penalty-for-environmental-crimes [https://perma.cc/DJ88H3MD].
3. Sue Reisinger, Carnival Names Ex-environmental Prosecutor Peter Anderson to
Chief Compliance Job, LAW.COM (Aug. 12, 2019, 12:44 PM), https://www.law.com/
corpcounsel/2019/08/12/carnival-names-ex-environmental-prosecutor-peter-anderson-tochief-compliance-job/ [https://perma.cc/59X4-T5SF]. The term, “dotted-line reporting”
ordinarily describes an informal, looser reporting relationship between the CCO and the
company’s board of directors, whereby the CCO can relay information of importance directly
to the board, rather than going through the CEO or general counsel. See, e.g., Donald C.
Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, Enterprise Risk, and the
Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495, 500.
4. Kishanthi Parella pithily summarizes this temporal dynamic: “change follows
scandal.” Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. 907, 916 (2018).
5. See generally Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075 (2016) (analyzing the symbiotic relationship between compliance
and corporate governance).
6. Although lawyers have long advised clients on how best to behave within the bounds
of the law, it is a more recent phenomenon whereby the multiple tasks we associate with the
word “compliance” have melded into a singular, essential corporate “function.” See generally
Geoffrey Parsons Miller, The Compliance Function: An Overview, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 981 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg
Ringe eds., 2018).
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The titles of these programs vary. Sometimes, for example, they include
the word “ethics,” resulting in the odd acronym CECO.7 In many other
instances, the CCO’s ethics oversight is presumed. Aside from titles, the
substance and structure of these programs also vary. The compliance
department may overlap with, or be coterminous with, the corporation’s legal
department—particularly when the corporation is privately held and small.8
In other instances—often, in large publicly held corporations—it operates as
a separate, stand-alone entity.9 In the latter case, the department’s personnel,
despite their legal degrees, report to an officer other than the firm’s chief
legal counsel. Regardless of their form, compliance departments have
become prevalent, if not ubiquitous, across many industries,10 with their
titular heads reporting to the firm’s highest levels of management.11
With responsibility comes power, or at least a colorable demand for a highpaying salary. Today’s top compliance officers—many of whom are, or once
were, practicing lawyers—command notably high salaries and possess the
types of resumes and past experience one commonly associates with the
highest echelons of the legal profession.12 For example, Anderson arrived at
7. Michelle DeStefano, Creating a Culture of Compliance: Why Departmentalization
May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 73–76 (2014).
8. José A. Tabuena, The Chief Compliance Officer vs the General Counsel: Friend or
Foe?, COMPLIANCE & ETHICS MAG., Dec. 2006, at 4, 4 (observing that “there are still a fair
number of companies where the [general counsel] also serves as the compliance officer”).
9. For arguments that the structure debate has led to a siloed approach to compliance that
underemphasizes the importance of information flows between employees and managers, see
Nicola Faith Sharpe, Prioritizing Process: Empowering the Corporate Ethics and
Compliance Function, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (arguing that those with a structuralist
orientation “pay comparatively little attention to how information flows to the [compliance]
managers holding those positions or how those managers use that information once they
receive it”). See also J. S. Nelson, Disclosure-Driven Crime, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487,
1559–62 (2019).
10. Joseph E. Murphy, Policies in Conflict: Undermining Corporate Self-Policing, 69
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 421, 423 (2017) (“It is now routinely accepted that companies should
have [compliance] programs to prevent and detect various forms of misconduct.”); see also
James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor: A Reorientation in Compliance for BrokerDealers, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1121, 1123 (observing compliance’s growth in the financial
industry, where compliance “is now well established and accepted in financial firms”). See
generally GEOFFREY MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
COMPLIANCE (2d ed. 2017) (representing the first compliance-oriented casebook released for
adoption in law schools); Griffith, supra note 5 (describing the growth and importance of
corporate compliance generally).
11. “[T]he corporate executives in charge of these small compliance armies have claimed
greater attention from the board, rising to top management ranks.” Stavros Gadinis & Amelia
Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2135, 2146 (2019) (citing
authorities tracing the compliance organization’s increase in importance and attention).
Despite compliance’s enhanced “profile,” it has not induced most corporate boards themselves
to denominate a specific committee to oversee compliance. See John Armour et al., Board
Compliance, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1191, 1200 (2020) (finding that “less than 5 percent of U.S.
public companies have established a separate Compliance Committee”).
12. As noted prominently in one of the articles reporting Anderson’s appointment,
Anderson “obtained his law degree from the University of Virginia School of Law in 1991.
He served as a trial attorney in the environmental crimes section at the Department of Justice
until 1994, when he was named Assistant U.S. Attorney in Charlotte, North Carolina.”
Reisinger, supra note 3. On the profusion of lawyers generally within the compliance sector,
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Carnival having already served in the Department of Justice’s Environmental
Crimes Section and United States Attorney’s Office in Charlotte, North
Carolina.13 Many CCOs at similarly high-profile corporations boast equally
impressive achievements.14
In sum, today’s top CCOs increasingly hail from a legal, business, and
educational elite. If they are lawyers (and many of them are), they can say
that they attended top law schools, worked as associates and perhaps partners
at prestigious law firms, and served stints in government agencies such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission.15 Their annual compensation reflects
this expertise, presenting attractive and potentially lucrative opportunities for
ambitious midcareer and senior attorneys.16
There exist many good reasons to be heartened by this trend. Just as they
have transformed the firm’s in-house legal function, elite lawyers promise to
imbue the firm’s corporate compliance function with a valuable mixture of
skills, prestige, and gravitas.17 Moreover, elite CCOs can attract talented
junior attorneys to their ranks and to the compliance industry overall, thereby
strengthening the field.
see Jennifer M. Pacella, The Regulation of Lawyers in Compliance, 95 WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 3, 7–12), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3430093
[https://perma.cc/QUW5-SRVJ] (citing studies documenting an increase in the number of
current or former lawyers who work “as compliance officers or as part of a compliance team”
and explaining the reasons for the increase of lawyers doing compliance work).
13. Jaeger, supra note 1.
14. See infra Part I.D.
15. Fanto, supra note 10, at 1123 (observing that a financial CCO “may often have spent
part of his or her career with the Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) or the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority (‘FINRA’)”).
The movement between government
enforcement positions and corporate compliance departments is reflective of a broader
“revolving door” phenomenon whereby attorneys routinely move back and forth between
government enforcement agencies, such as the SEC or Department of Justice (DOJ), and
private sector jobs with law firms or corporations. For a helpful overview of the phenomenon
and the normative debate it has generated, see James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Revolving
Elites: The Unexplored Risk of Capturing the SEC, 107 GEO. L.J. 845, 849–53 (2019).
16. For more on salary information, see discussion infra Part I.C. Readers will note that
this discussion focuses exclusively on CCOs and high-level compliance personnel. Although
a number of attorneys who now occupy CCO positions worked previously in lower-level
compliance positions, many compliance “superstars” appear to have attained their initial
experience as associates in prestigious law firms (“Big Law”) and as prosecutors and
enforcement attorneys within high-profile federal agencies.
17. “Since the 1970’s, the [chief legal officer] has enjoyed substantial stature and
responsibility within the firm, commensurate with the perceived value of corporate counsel
and the legal function by senior executives.” Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The
Domains of Corporate Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 209 (2016).
A rich literature explores the evolving roles of in-house counsel and business lawyers
generally. See generally Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984); Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market: The
Evolving Role of Business Lawyers, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1105 (2005) (exploring changes in
the market for legal services and its effect on the major accounting frauds that occurred at the
end of the 1990s and early 2000s); Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel,
and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 457 (2000) (focusing on in-house attorneys); Eli Wald, In-House Myths, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 407 (exploring and exploding a number of the stronger myths that revolve around
contemporary in-house legal practice).
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Before proceeding further, it is important to define the terms “elite” and
“compliance.” As used in this context, the term “elite” refers to an attorney’s
academic and postgraduate achievements: her education, her awards while
in law school, her clerkship, and the various positions she held after law
school.18 Elitism is admittedly enmeshed with contestable presumptions
about meritocracy,19 but it functions as a useful proxy for, among other
things, the compliance officer’s market power.
“Compliance” is a term of art that has come to describe the core
coordination function responsible for a number of monitoring and oversight
tasks within the firm. These include: explaining and translating laws;
identifying risks; analyzing failures and remediating weaknesses; and finally,
investigating reports of wrongdoing and advising the company’s top decision
makers on next steps.20 Some of these tasks will be taken up by in-house
lawyers within the general counsel’s direct jurisdiction and some by
members of the compliance department who also happen to be lawyers.
Others will be handled by attorneys and legal consultants who work outside
the firm. It is beyond argument, however, that individuals who hold legal
degrees (and were therefore trained in law schools and other legal settings)
will, in some form or another, oversee or engage in a good portion of the
firm’s compliance-related work.

18. This discussion incorporates a “human capital” theory of elitism, whereby an
attorney’s elite credentials reflect some mix of expertise, skills training, and ability. See, e.g.,
Cox & Thomas, supra note 15, at 856 (citing authorities). None of this is to deny that these
“objective” achievements may be partially the product of racial and socioeconomic privilege.
See, e.g., Kevin Woodson, Human Capital Discrimination, Law Firm Inequality, and the
Limits of Title VII, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 183, 185 (2016) (citing “disparate access to highquality work opportunities” among black junior law firm associates); see also David B.
Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and
Information Control in the Internal Labor Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581,
1608 (1998) (arguing that elite law firms do not host level playing fields for associates seeking
partnership).
19. “A meritocratic worldview endorses the belief that anyone, regardless of their social
location, is free to be successful through their own merits. Under this logic, individual
outcomes are fair and deserved because they are the result of . . . individual talent and effort.”
Leisy Abrego, Legitimacy, Social Identity, and the Mobilization of Law: The Effects of
Assembly Bill 540 on Undocumented Students in California, 33 LAW & SOC’Y INQUIRY 709,
711–12 (2008) (citations omitted) (describing the meritocratic worldview that has become
“deeply rooted” in American culture). For a recent critique of meritocracy’s assumptions and
normative implications, see generally DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP: HOW
AMERICA’S FOUNDATIONAL MYTH FEEDS INEQUALITY, DISMANTLES THE MIDDLE CLASS, AND
DEVOURS THE ELITE (2019).
20. See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949,
958 (2009) (defining compliance as “a system of policies and controls that organizations adopt
to deter violations of law and to assure external authorities” that they are doing so); Fanto,
supra note 10, at 1143–48; Miller, supra note 6, at 981 (describing the function as one which
“consists of efforts organizations undertake to ensure that employees and others associated
with the firm do not violate applicable rules, regulations, or norms”). As Pacella points out,
many of these tasks are well suited for someone with legal training. Pacella, supra note 12
(manuscript at 10).
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Scholars have already highlighted the drawbacks of placing the company’s
general counsel directly in charge of the compliance function.21 They have
also theorized the reasons why in-house corporate lawyers have been
unsuccessful in preventing corporate malfeasance.22 This Article’s modest
goal is to chart a phenomenon few would conceptualize as a problem at all:
the emergence of a compliance elite. Elite compliance officers—particularly
those with the strongest and most impressive legal backgrounds—may be
prone to a weakness that I refer to here as a performance blind spot. This
concept self-consciously draws on the now famous ethical blind spots that
business ethicists Max Bazerman and Ann Tenbrunsel articulated in their
foundational work on organizational wrongdoing.23
The ethical blind spot literature powerfully demonstrates a divergence
between ethical behavior and ethical perception.24 Particularly when people
are acting under time pressure or in the moment, their “blind spots” prevent
them from recognizing the moral and ethical implications of their behavior.25
Ethical blind spots permit individuals to view themselves as upstanding
citizens, even as they gradually “engage in ethically questionable behavior
that contradicts their own preferred ethics.”26 The persistence of these blind
spots explains not only how otherwise “good” individuals manage to delude

21. The concern is usually voiced as one of conflicting alliances: “Legal writers have
puzzled over the professional responsibilities of compliance officers who are also in-house
lawyers, thus bound by their duties to the corporate client.” Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 11,
at 2149–50; Langevoort, supra note 3, at 500 (citing the “robust debate” as to whether the inhouse legal department should be “walled off” from the compliance function); Pacella, supra
note 12 (manuscript at 36–37) (describing the conflicting allegiances the general counsel and
compliance officer hold).
22. The Fordham Law Review’s December 2005 symposium issue is particularly on point.
See Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-situating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983 (2005); Manuel A. Utset, A Model of Time-Inconsistent Conduct:
The Case of Lawyer Misconduct, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1319 (2005); see also Jill Fisch &
Kenneth Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV.
1097 (2003).
23. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011). Tenbrunsel has published numerous
articles on ethical weaknesses with additional coauthors. See, e.g., Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David
M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST.
RES. 223, 227–28 (2004); Ann Tenbrunsel & Kristin Smith-Crowe, Ethical Decision-Making:
Where We’ve Been and Where We’re Going, 2 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 545 (2008).
24. See BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 23, at 43 (stating that the “core aspect” of
a concept known as “bounded ethicality” is that “people often act unethically without their
own awareness”). According to Yuval Feldman, this literature helps us see “the gap between
how ethical we think we are and how ethical we actually are.” YUVAL FELDMAN, THE LAW OF
GOOD PEOPLE: CHALLENGING STATES’ ABILITY TO REGULATE HUMAN BEHAVIOR 38 (2018).
Feldman, whose recent book comprehensively surveys all of the recent research in this area,
dubs this discipline the study of “behavioral ethics.” See id. at 2–3 (distinguishing behavioral
law and economics, which studies gaps in rationality, from behavioral ethics, which
“addresses people’s inability to fully recognize the ethical, moral and legal aspects of their
behavior”).
25. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 23, at 66–72.
26. Id. at 5.
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themselves into engaging in wrongdoing but also why conventional
exhortations to follow the rules may fall short within corporate settings.27
All employees are—to some degree or another—prone to ethical blind
spots and bounded ethicality. The aim of this Article, however, is to suggest
that the elite compliance officer wears an additional set of blinkers, which
blinds her to emerging misconduct within the firm. These additional blind
spots, I argue, are bound up with the tricky question of how the firm goes
about judging and rewarding its employees’ performance.28 Measuring and
compensating performance has long been understood to play a foundational
role in fueling corporate misconduct; employees violate laws in order to
preserve their jobs or get ahead.29 As I argue here, if corporate employees
slide into illegal behavior because of their ethical blind spots, their elite
overseers may be just as badly hobbled by their own performance blind spots.
Consider an admittedly oversimplified narrative of how for-profit firms
commonly reward their employees (or at least claim they do). Supervisors
reward lower-level employees for their industry and initiative, often referred
to as “productivity.”30 Employees who perform above the mean receive
bonuses and promotions; those who fall below perhaps receive warnings,
reductions in salary, and forced buyouts. Compensation, promotion, and
even just the preservation of one’s job are all said to hinge on one’s
performance.31
From an economist’s perspective, there is nothing wrong with
incentivizing or rewarding performance. Performance affords the firm a far
superior methodology for doling out rewards than social status, race, or
gender (not to mention personal corruption).32 Measurement nevertheless
27. Cf. FELDMAN, supra note 24, at 11 (arguing that we currently “lack sufficient
knowledge about individuals’ awareness of the ethicality of their behavior and their ability to
control” their ethical blind spots). Feldman later urges policymakers to revisit “many of the
existing behavioral models of legal regulation and enforcement, which for the most part have
relied on the assumption of deliberateness and rationality.” Id. at 14.
28. Much of the corporate management literature focuses on how managers motivate,
measure, and compensate employee performance. See, e.g., Martin Petrin, Corporate
Management in the Age of AI, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 965, 978 (describing managerial
work and managers’ influence over corporate workforces).
29. See, e.g., John Armour et al., Taking Compliance Seriously, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 18
(2020) (discussing the compliance implications of poorly designed performance targets); see
also discussion infra Part II.A.
30. The managerial performance literature overlaps the study of industrial organizations
and workplace bureaucracy. For more on the latter and the profusion of “branching
hierarchies” within large, publicly held corporations that internalize and implement the firm’s
performance objectives, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Privately Ordered Participatory
Management: An Organizational Failures Analysis, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 979, 1009 (1998)
(describing hierarchies throughout publicly held corporations, through which higher- and midlevel managers direct and monitor workplace performance).
31. “[E]xceptional managerial service may find its reward in a better reputation or in job
offers from other firms, just as poor performance can jeopardize tenure by triggering
termination . . . .” Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 863 (1984).
32. It is of course true that so-called objective performance factors can instead mask bias.
See, e.g., Woodson, supra note 18, at 186. Not all performance hinges on a supervisor’s
subjective assessment. Companies increasingly rely on “data analytics” to judge the
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can instigate unethical, and potentially illegal, behavior. One need only
glance at highly touted workplace surveys to confirm this unfortunate fact.33
Scholars have long recognized that distortions and outright cheating arise in
response to disappointing results.34 Missed targets, in turn, incite rational
fears of termination and demotion. Cheating, moreover, carries viral
qualities; misconduct in one unit can spread quickly to others, and cheating
in one company can induce cheating among one’s competitors.35
Accordingly, when misused or misunderstood, performance metrics can fuel
costly and perverse behavior, the very types of behavior the compliance
function seeks to identify, prevent, and remediate.36
This in turn creates an interesting dilemma for elite lawyers because they,
for much of their adult lives, have landed on the right side of the performance
curve. They achieved high grades throughout their academic careers. They
fared well on standardized tests such as the LSAT. They attained various
honors in law school, where many exams are graded on a curve.37 And they
took and passed their state’s bar exam, a test that mercilessly excludes from
the legal profession those whose scores fall below a set floor.38
The foregoing recitation does not even begin to describe the elite lawyer’s
legal career by the time she reaches the position of CCO.39 If she boasts the
performance of their workers. See Matthew T. Bodie, Workplace Freakonomics, 14 I/S: J.L.
& POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 37, 42 (2017) (explaining how firms have come to employ data to
better analyze employee performance).
33. See generally INTERPERSONAL MISCONDUCT IN THE WORKPLACE: WHAT IT IS, HOW IT
OCCURS AND WHAT YOU SHOULD DO ABOUT IT, ETHICS & COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (2018),
https://www.ethics.org/download-the-2018-global-business-ethics-survey/ [https://perma.cc/
6KZD-F9ST]; PWC, PULLING FRAUD OUT OF THE SHADOWS: GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRIME AND
FRAUD SURVEY (2018), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/forensics/global-economic-crime-andfraud-survey-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX52-AN69].
34. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities
Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 693 (articulating the famous theory
that securities fraud “usually occurs when agents fear themselves to be in their last period of
employment”). Arlen and Carney’s “last-period hypothesis” assumed that the firm was ailing
and therefore placed the high-level employee in his “last period” of employment. Id. at 702–
03.
35. See Todd Haugh, The Power Few of Compliance, 53 GA. L. REV. 129, 166–70 (2018)
(employing network theory to explain how lawbreaking spreads throughout organizations);
see also Christina Parajon Skinner, Misconduct Risk, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1559, 1576–82
(2016) (exploring the ways in which misconduct in one institution spreads to others within the
same industry, thereby undermining a system).
36. Armour et al., supra note 29, at 19.
37. “[A] top law school adds the final link in a long chain of rigorous schooling. Students
at elite professional schools overwhelmingly earned their A grades at highly selective
colleges . . . .” MARKOVITS, supra note 19, at 7 (explaining that law school represents the
culmination of the student’s participation in a series of “multistage meritocratic
tournaments”).
38. For the purposes of this discussion, I assume this performance was authentic.
Compliance attorneys who cheated on the bar or plagiarized papers in college or law school
would, of course, present a host of different risks to firms who sought their services.
39. See, e.g., Gabe Friedman, GM Promotes Deputy GC to Chief Compliance Officer,
BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 27, 2016), https://biglawbusiness.com/gm-promotes-deputy-gc-tochief-compliance-officer [https://perma.cc/H259-EBFX] (describing Jeffrey Taylor’s
background before advancing to General Motors’s CCO position, which included stints in the
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type of resume that many high-profile CCOs now have, she likely has entered
and won multiple workplace contests, coming out on top of an increasingly
rarefied group of fellow attorneys and professionals.40 In sum, the typical
elite lawyer who attains the position of a Fortune 500 CCO is, beyond all, a
good performer, and oddly enough, this may create difficulties in how she
evaluates and protects the firm’s performance systems.
Performance blind spots pose interesting challenges for the field of
corporate compliance. Writ large, they undermine the compliance function’s
mission. On a more retail level, they elucidate how a good faith effort to
pump up one’s compliance program—by, for example, hiring a top attorney
with a fancy resume—may end in regrettable failure. Concededly,
compliance elites may be able to mediate their biases, but they need to know
they exist in the first place.
The remainder of this piece unfolds as follows: Part I highlights the
emergence of an elite cadre of compliance professionals. Part II synthesizes
elitism’s benefits to compliance. Part III constructs the theory of the
performance blind spot and hypothesizes its contribution to noncompliance.
Part IV briefly highlights developments in compliance from which one might
draw useful prescriptions.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF A COMPLIANCE ELITE
A. The Billion-Dollar Industry
It is hardly news to anyone in the corporate world that compliance is a
billion-dollar business. Although reports vary (in part because the relevant
industry varies), the global “enterprise, governance, risk and compliance”
market has been forecasted to exceed $50 billion within the next five years.41
In 2018, William Laufer cited an impending “milestone” whereby the
number of corporate audit, legal, and compliance-related employees would
eventually match (and presumably exceed) the number of police officers in
the United States.42 Major firms, most notably financial institutions,
Department of Justice, as U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, and as Raytheon’s
general counsel).
40. Some of these contests may be properly described as tournaments. A tournament
system promotes a fixed percentage of employees and exchanges a portion of current
compensation for future compensation. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 18, at 1583 (explaining
the basic theory).
41. Enterprise Governance, Risk & Compliance Market Worth $88.48 Billion by 2027,
GRAND VIEW RES. (Feb. 2020), https://www.grandviewresearch.com/press-release/globalenterprise-governance-risk-compliance-egrc-market
[https://perma.cc/QLJ7-5A9T]
(forecasting a market in excess of $80 billion by 2027); Global Governance, Risk and
Compliance Platform Market Report 2019: Market Was Worth US$ 24.9 Billion in 2018 and
Is Expected to Reach $47.1 Billion by 2024, PR NEWSWIRE: CISION (Mar. 25, 2019, 7:15 PM),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-governance-risk-and-complianceplatform-market-report-2019-market-was-worth-us-24-9-billion-in-2018-and-is-expected-toreach-47-1-billion-by-2024--300817601.html [https://perma.cc/JX8K-L2E7] (forecasting a
market worth more than $47 billion by 2024).
42. William S. Laufer, A Very Special Regulatory Milestone, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 392, 393
(2018). Laufer came up with the figure by combining the Bureau of Labor’s estimates of the
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routinely spend in the tens, if not hundreds, of millions of dollars or more in
this area and seem poised to continue to do so.43 Compliance has thus
become a lucrative source of income for attorneys, white shoe or “Big Law”
firms, and alternative legal services providers such as KPMG and
PricewaterhouseCoopers.44
Because compliance intersects heavily with law, the legal education
market has long positioned itself as a feeder and credentialing service for
businesses seeking compliance expertise.45 Law schools routinely advertise
programs and certificates in compliance and risk management.46 Geoffrey
Miller has published a legal casebook47 on corporate compliance and
currently acts as the lead reporter for the American Law Institute’s Principles
of Corporate Compliance and Risk Management.48 At the same time,
business schools hire legal scholars to study and teach compliance and ethicsrelated topics.49

number of compliance officers employed in 2016 (273,000) plus a “modest percentage” of
professionals across the “FinTech and RegTech ecosystem.” Id. at 393 n.1.
43. Id. at 394.
44. See generally Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The Rise
of Corporate White-Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1221 (2011).
On the rise of alternative legal service providers and the “Big Four” accounting firms (all of
whom supply compliance-related consulting), see RANDALL KISER, AMERICAN LAW FIRMS IN
TRANSITION: TRENDS, THREATS, AND STRATEGIES 28–30 (2019).
45. As Pacella observes, law schools intensified their emphasis on compliance in the wake
of the 2008 recession and contraction in the traditional legal market. See Pacella, supra note
12 (manuscript at 8–12).
46. According to the American Bar Association’s website, at least seventeen law schools
of varying ranks offer either an LLM, certificate, or similar degree in ethics and risk
management or corporate, financial, or health-care compliance. LL.M. and Post-J.D. Degrees
by School, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/llmdegrees_post_j_d_non_j_d/programs_by_school/ [https://perma.cc/QSB6-L2RB] (last visited
Mar. 17, 2020).
47. See generally MILLER, supra note 10.
48. See Principles of the Law, Compliance, Risk Management and Enforcement, AM. L.
INST.,
https://www.ali.org/projects/show/compliance-enforcement-and-risk-managementcorporations-nonprofits-and-other-organizations/#_participants
[https://perma.cc/9T3X95EP] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). Jennifer Arlen, James Fanto, and Claire Hill are
coreporters on this multiyear project. Id.
49. The author is a senior fellow of the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business
Ethics Research at Wharton. People, U. PA.:
WHARTON, https://live-whartonzicklincenter.pantheonsite.io/people [https://perma.cc/2LUM-CGK4] (last visited Mar. 17,
2020). Other schools feature departments and programs in business law and ethics. For
example, Indiana University at Bloomington’s Kelley School of Business promotes a
Department of Business Law and Ethics and the University of Michigan’s Ross School of
Business recently announced a major gift to be used to create a new Business Ethics and
Communication Center. See $5 Million Gift Will Establish New Business Ethics and
Communications Program at Michigan Ross, U. MICH. ROSS SCH. BUS.,
https://michiganross.umich.edu/ross-news-blog/2019/06/20/5-million-gift-will-establishnew-business-ethics-and-communications [https://perma.cc/8ZQH-X2TE] (last visited Mar.
17, 2020); Business Law & Ethics at Kelley School of Business, IND. U. BLOOMINGTON,
https://kelley.iu.edu/faculty-research/departments/business-law-ethics/index.cshtml
[https://perma.cc/5DXY-E7UQ] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
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Much of this growth is attributable to a series of doctrinal rules50 and
institutional policies51 that either require or strongly encourage firms to
implement internal monitoring and control systems. As the industry matures,
however, some of the growth within individual firms can be traced to the
various for-profit businesses who pitch compliance services and products.52
Familiar narratives of following the herd and conflating size for effectiveness
lead firms to overinvest in compliance expenditures, even as they remain
uncertain of their respective programs’ overall effectiveness.53
B. The Argument(s) for Compliance
Numerous legal regimes encourage or effectively require for-profit firms
to implement compliance programs. One need not describe all of these
programs here; the most cited include the Department of Justice’s Principles
of Federal Prosecution, the United States Sentencing Guidelines provisions
for organizational offenders, and more recently, guidance issued by foreign
enforcers, such as the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office.54 Each of
these regimes partially judges a corporate offender’s behavior through the
lens of its compliance program. “Good” firms nurture and grow their
compliance departments; “bad” ones starve the function altogether or engage
in elaborate window dressing.
Over the past decade, the Department of Justice has issued written,
nonbinding guidance documents to aid prosecutors (and indirectly, corporate
directors) in executing their compliance oversight obligations.55 These
documents, although written in the vague, high-level language of regulatoryspeak, shed some light on the department’s thought process.56 Overall, its
50. See generally Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND.
L. REV. 2013 (2019) (tracing the emergence of Delaware’s oversight doctrine).
51. See generally Baer, supra note 20 (analyzing compliance’s relationship with the
Department of Justice’s internal charging guidance for prosecutors, which also promises
leniency to firms that adopt effective compliance programs); Laufer, supra note 42
(connecting the rise of compliance to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines put in place
in 2001, which reduced a corporate offender’s punishment in cases where the entity
demonstrated an “effective compliance program”). A number of regulatory agencies
separately encourage firms to maintain compliance programs. Armour et al., supra note 29, at
2.
52. Presumably, not all of this “help” is valuable. See Donald C. Langevoort, Cultures of
Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 933 (2017) (observing that “[c]onsultants and vendors
advocate a seductive (and often expensive) set of ideas, products and services . . . in the name
of self-protection, abetted by in-house compliance personnel who covet the additional
resources and status that come from increased company investments . . . .”).
53. Laufer, supra note 42, at 407; see also Armour et al., supra note 29, at 15 (advising
that “relatively little is known about the structure and efficacy of corporate compliance”).
54. JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.000 (U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2018); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018); Deferred Prosecution
Agreements, U.K. SERIOUS FRAUD OFF., https://www.sfo.gov.uk/publications/guidancepolicy-and-protocols/deferred-prosecution-agreements/
[https://perma.cc/5D6L-WRMZ]
(last visited Mar. 17, 2020).
55. JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-28.100.
56. Laufer’s criticism of the government’s guidance on compliance is particularly
scathing: “Regulators tease the regulated with rudimentary prescriptions for diligence that
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prosecutors prefer programs that are well resourced and deliberately
designed, that employ qualified compliance personnel, and that enable
employees to communicate compliance concerns effectively and without fear
of retaliation.57
If a company can establish its compliance program’s efficacy, it can avoid
a criminal prosecution altogether or at least secure an agreement with
prosecutors that requires fewer interventions in its operations and corporate
governance.58 Compliance pays for itself when it substantially reduces the
company’s exposure to harsher punishment outcomes.59 This is most likely
to be the case when the company’s compliance program voluntarily discloses
wrongdoing that was previously unknown to government authorities.60
Although there exist many good reasons to erect a sophisticated
compliance department, countervailing forces threaten to weaken it. First,
compliance costs money, both in terms of head count and systems.61 Second,
compliance is often thought to reduce flexibility in corporate planning and
interfere with spontaneous decision-making.62 Third, insofar as the
appear to be literally ripped from the pages of introductory management textbooks and
business airport books.” Laufer, supra note 42, at 405.
57. In the spring of 2019, the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division released an
additional nonbinding manual that poses a series of open-ended questions designed to aid
prosecutors and corporate compliance officers in evaluating compliance programs. Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division Announces Publication of Guidance on
Evaluating Corporate Compliance Programs (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/criminal-division-announces-publication-guidance-evaluating-corporate-complianceprograms [https://perma.cc/23Z3-2F6X]; see also Armour et al., supra note 29, at 16–17
(describing the DOJ’s compliance manual’s major points of emphasis).
58. On the emergence of nonprosecution and deferred prosecution agreements, see
generally Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal
Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea
Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537 (2015) (reporting research of several years’ worth of
organizational settlements) and see also BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW
PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 47 (2014) (critiquing negotiations between
prosecutors and corporations).
59. This valuable “carrot” is one of the reasons a director’s failure to ensure the
compliance function’s existence constitutes a violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. See
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (locating the oversight duty within the fiduciary
duty of loyalty); In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). Although
shareholders have brought lawsuits advancing Caremark-type claims, these claims
infrequently succeed, in part because Delaware’s standard sets the compliance bar so low. See,
e.g., Gideon Mark, Private FCPA Enforcement, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 419, 479–84 (2012)
(recounting cases in which Caremark-type claims have failed). For a more recent account of
how Caremark claims have developed into dual duties of oversight and obedience, see
Pollman, supra note 50, at 2027 (Caremark and its progeny “reflect[] an understanding that
fidelity to the law is nonnegotiable.”).
60. The DOJ has emphasized a potential declination of all charges when the firm
voluntarily discloses violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. See Sharon Oded,
Trumping Recidivism: Assessing the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. ONLINE 135, 136 (2018).
61. See Armour et al., supra note 29, at 13 (describing training and head count costs, as
well as the “costs of integrating the program into the firm’s business structure”).
62. See, e.g., Fanto, supra note 10, at 1129 (examining how “the increase in compliance
burdens on broker-dealers may undermine the flexibility and capacity for innovation that is
the hallmark of a beneficial finance”).
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compliance program incorporates employee discipline, it introduces a
measure of distrust among mid-level managers and employees.63 Fourth, the
government’s promise of leniency is discretionary and unenforceable; the
uncertainty this breeds weakens the corporation’s resolve to investigate and
report instances of wrongdoing.64
A seesaw dynamic thus materializes. Regulators and prosecutors prompt
the compliance function’s formation and an eager industry evolves to support
it. A series of countervailing factors just as strongly undermine the function’s
effectiveness, leading critics and regulators alike to wonder how seriously
corporate management takes its responsibility. After some hand-wringing,
government actors and corporate boards respond by doubling down. They
order more compliance products, hire more compliance personnel, and
enshrine at the top of this pyramid a CCO whose credentials and background
render her a sure bet for steering the company into safer waters. The market
for the elite CCO thus arises out of compliance’s most notable failures, not
its successes.
C. The Structural Debate
Commentators have debated how best to structure the firm’s compliance
function. Should it be helmed by an attorney or directed by someone with an
accounting background?65 Should “compliance” exist as an independent
entity, with direct access to the board, or should it nest within the in-house
legal department, reporting up to a general counsel? Scholars have examined
these issues at length, often instantiating the debate’s context-specific
characteristics.66 Suffice it to say that independent programs come out ahead
insofar as they visibly coordinate the firm’s compliance activities and
promote greater transparency in regard to the firm’s overall compliance
expenditures.67 Integrated programs, however, benefit from the presence of
a strong general counsel’s office and from the professionalism and
independent judgment (admittedly aspirational) with which attorneys have
been taught to approach their jobs.68
The foregoing debate obscures an important point: regardless of how a
firm chooses to meet its compliance obligations, it will likely rely on
attorneys to carry out its compliance-related tasks if it is a high-profile,

63. Miriam H. Baer, Designing Corporate Leniency Programs, in CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK ON COMPLIANCE (Daniel Sokol & Benjamin van Rooij eds., forthcoming)
(manuscript at 10), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3555950 [https://
perma.cc/W2LB-ELHJ].
64. Id. (manuscript at 9–10).
65. As compliance becomes more digital, we might ask whether the compliance officer
should boast a background in information technology as well.
66. See, e.g., Bird & Park, supra note 17, at 205 (arguing that a corporation’s chief legal
officer must retain responsibility for communicating ethical values throughout the firm);
DeStefano, supra note 7, at 76–78.
67. At times, government officials have themselves voiced a preference for stand-alone,
independent programs. See DeStefano, supra note 7, at 107.
68. Id. at 159–60.
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publicly held corporation.69 These attorneys may engage this work in their
professional capacity or in a more consultative capacity from outside the
firm; alternately, they may simply be the firm’s “compliance employees”
who happen to have legal training. But it is beyond cavil that a noticeable
cross section of the compliance industry—including those who have risen to
industry’s highest rungs—will have been trained in the legal profession and
will have emerged from the familiar competitive atmospheres that pervade
law schools and legal practice.70
D. Paying Top Dollar for Talent
As compliance becomes more prevalent, it also grows in complexity.
Global businesses must attend to regulatory and legal challenges in countries
other than just the United States and often must take note of the third parties
and supply chains with whom the firm interacts.71 Technology and privacy
concerns create different and additional headaches; the firm must internalize
laws intended to protect employees and consumers, including laws outside
the United States if the company is multinational.72 Moreover, aggressive
compliance efforts can render the firm vulnerable to civil litigation with
former employees or clients.73 Accordingly, firms with particularly complex
and ongoing compliance needs must be willing to pay top dollar for
managerial talent.
Over the past decade, the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics
(SCCE), a nonprofit trade organization for compliance professionals, has
published a series of benchmark surveys on the compliance industry.74 The
most recent survey, which was performed in 2017, confirms the growth of
the CCO’s responsibilities and corresponding salary range.75 At least onethird of survey respondents manage annual compliance budgets of over $1
million; 16 percent report that they manage budgets greater than $2 million.76
Of those surveyed, 25 percent report 5000 or more employees subject to the
compliance function’s oversight responsibilities.77 One-third of those
surveyed report that they manage compliance in more than one country.78

69. Id. at 73–74.
70. Pacella, supra note 12 (manuscript at 11–12).
71. See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, Outsourcing Corporate Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV.
747, 767–69 (2014) (examining the challenges of reducing human rights–related and other
violations across global supply chains).
72. Miriam H. Baer, When the Corporation Investigates Itself, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING 308, 322–23 (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2018).
73. Id.
74. See generally SOC’Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS, 2017 CROSS INDUSTRY CHIEF
COMPLIANCE
OFFICER
AND
STAFF
SALARY
SURVEYS
(2017),
https://
assets.corporatecompliance.org/Portals/1/PDF/Resources/Surveys/scce-2017-cco-and-staffsalary-survey.pdf?ver=2017-11-16-145255-487 [https://perma.cc/R2KK-S7K6].
75. Id. at 9.
76. Id. at 8.
77. Id. at 9.
78. Id. at 11.
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The officers surveyed worked for a variety of firms (public, private, and
nonprofit) and displayed different degrees of tenure in the compliance
profession and their respective firms.79 Some compliance managers have
worked within the compliance profession and have managed their
compliance department for many years. Many others, however, are new to
their company’s compliance department and new to the compliance
profession itself.80 Given the familiar announcements one sees in the wake
of various corporate scandals, one would not be surprised if some of these
“newbies” are in fact elites who have been recruited from prestigious law
firms and federal enforcement agencies.
For at least one cross section of CCOs, annual salaries can be quite high.81
Total cash compensation (salary plus cash bonus) hovered near $300,000 for
firms featuring more than twenty employees in the compliance organization
and more than 30,000 employees in the organization overall.82 CCOs who
managed budgets of $2 million or more (16 percent of those who responded
to the survey) earned an average of $329,000 in total compensation.83 At the
seventy-fifth percentile for number of compliance employees and
compliance budget, total cash compensation rose to nearly $400,000.84 This
amount does not include noncash compensation such as stock awards.
Finally, JD degrees were prevalent across all sectors of CCO employment
(at least 33 percent, except for very small firms) and seemed to be more
common within firms that employed 30,000 or more employees (43
percent).85 Compliance staff below the CCO level, but occupying vice
president positions, also included JD degrees (32 percent).86
The claim here is not that all CCOs are earning enormous sums, or even
that they are all attorneys. Rather, it is that there exists a small group of
individuals who are earning in excess of $350,000 in annual cash
compensation, who run major organizations within exponentially larger
firms, and who likely have JD degrees. These individuals, whose talents and
past practice are often touted in press releases, have taken the reins of the
firm’s compliance (and sometimes legal) organization within a wide array of

79. Id. (showing an array of years spent managing the compliance department); id. at 15
(showing a similar array in regard to years in compliance profession).
80. Id. at 11, 15.
81. Roughly one-third of those who responded were CCOs for only a division of the
organization, whereas two-thirds were CCOs for the entire organization. Id. at 30.
Presumably, this affected reports of compensation.
82. Id. at 17 (showing the number of employees in compliance groups); id. at 18 (showing
the number of employees overall).
83. Id. at 18.
84. Id. at 26.
85. Id. at 39.
86. Id. at 56.
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publicly held Fortune 500 companies, from Cisco87 to ViacomCBS88 to
General Motors89 to Walmart.90 Even if they lack previous experience
managing a compliance program, those who occupy these posts are well
remunerated, highly regarded, and experienced in multiple areas of
sophisticated legal and regulatory practice. They are a compliance dream
team and, yet, despite (or perhaps because of) their elite credentials, they may
eventually fail.
II. ELITISM’S VIRTUES
The preceding section established that corporate compliance has become
a lucrative industry that has begun to attract an elite group of attorneys to its
highest positions. In this Part, I tease apart the reasons for hiring an elite
actor from outside the firm and placing him or her atop the firm’s compliance
organization.
A. Human Capital
Elite CCOs lend the firm their unique mixtures of legal acumen, expertise,
and work ethic. A firm might decide that it is easier and more reliable to
purchase these traits from an outside market rather than grow them from
within.91
Compliance work is difficult. To implement an effective compliance
function, an officer must comprehend, synthesize, and communicate a series
of complex, overlapping, and often confusing laws to relevant actors.
Moreover, she must adapt that message for the different audiences and
stakeholders within the firm. A good CCO must also comprehend the firm’s
operations, its peculiar governance structure, and its financial reporting and
87. Executive Biography:
Mark Chandler, CISCO:
NETWORK, https://
newsroom.cisco.com/execbio-detail?articleId=33227 [https://perma.cc/2ERV-SST4] (last
visited Mar. 17, 2020) (outlining the biography of Mark Chandler, Cisco’s chief legal and
compliance officer, who received his JD from Stanford and BA in economics from Harvard).
88. Henry Moniz, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/henry-moniz-94526017
[https://perma.cc/8PLZ-HJJR] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (offering the professional history
of Henry Moniz, CCO at ViacomCBS, who graduated from the University of Pennsylvania’s
law school, served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the DOJ’s Criminal Division and was a
partner at Bingham McCutchen).
89. Jeffrey Taylor, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/jeffrey-taylor-2bb41649
[https://perma.cc/6ULW-WAD7] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (detailing Jeffrey Taylor’s
professional history as CCO for General Motors, U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia,
and a graduate of Harvard Law School); see also GM Names Jeffrey A. Taylor New Chief
Compliance Officer, NEWSWHEEL (Apr. 27, 2016), https://thenewswheel.com/gm-namesjeffrey-a-taylor-new-chief-compliance-officer/
[https://
perma.cc/QZK2-JP5B].
90. Elizabeth Olson, Walmart Hires Former Prosecutor for Ethics Job, BLOOMBERG L.
(May 22, 2019), https://biglawbusiness.com/walmart-hires-former-federal-prosecutor-forethics-job [https://perma.cc/9VKB-AZJ6] (describing David Searle’s background, including
a federal appeals court clerkship after law school and time as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in
Houston and as an associate at Baker Botts).
91. Even if the firm values an insider’s knowledge and loyalty, it can reward that insider
with a lesser position, such as vice president or director.
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extant internal controls. Across the firm, the CCO must develop the informal
connections and formal structures sufficient to identify weaknesses and risks
inherent in various practices and policies.
If compliance represents a marriage of the firm’s “enterprise” risks and its
corresponding “legal” risks, the effective CCO’s task is to become a miniexpert in both, to immerse herself in her company’s “structures,”
“processes,” and overall culture, while keeping a critical eye on the legal and
regulatory world that either buffets or cocoons her employer.92 And she
should do all this while building up sufficient resources for her own group,
exercising good managerial skills, and preparing for sudden storms, since
compliance issues can arise unexpectedly.
To a corporate board or CEO, elite credentials function as a proxy for the
aforementioned skills. As associates within Big Law settings, elite
compliance lawyers were forced to digest huge amounts of information in
short periods of time. As line prosecutors and enforcement attorneys, they
became experts in particular areas of the law and gained intimate knowledge
of the various regulatory agencies overseeing the firm’s business. As
students in highly competitive law school settings, they bested their peers
over a period of years, performing well on high-pressure tests.
To be sure, elite associates and government attorneys are far from the only
lawyers who possess these traits. There may well exist a pool of lawyers (or,
for that matter, nonlawyers) who possess these and other traits and who might
be more valuable to the firm.93 Nevertheless, if a board wishes to quickly
“buy” an impressive compliance officer, the elite lawyer’s credentials
provide an extra layer of insurance. If all goes wrong, no one will blame the
board for having hired a former Assistant U.S. Attorney who attended a “top
ten” law school and served as a senior associate or junior partner at a “top
fifty” law firm.
B. Securing Resources
Compliance work isn’t just difficult; it is also expensive. Educating
employees takes time, as does the integration of compliance procedures into
the rest of the firm. Monitoring efforts require intelligent planning and

92. On the ways in which processes and structures impact compliance, see generally
Veronica Root Martinez, The Compliance Process, 94 IND. L.J. 203 (2019). See generally
Sharpe, supra note 9; Veronica Root Martinez, Complex Compliance Investigations, COLUM.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3350463
[https://perma.cc/6DNB-D2SW].
93. For example, lawyers with significant seniority within the organization or lawyers
who have a long and distinguished record of heading up compliance efforts at other companies
may possess the same, or more valuable, qualities as a lawyer recruited from a Big Law firm
or the upper echelons of the DOJ or SEC. For example, Ben Bard, who became CCO at Archer
Daniels Midland (ADM) in the wake of a foreign bribery settlement, had prior experience
managing Coca Cola’s compliance and ethics department before taking on ADM’s position.
Jaclyn Jaeger, Ben Bard: Crusader of Compliance, COMPLIANCE WK. (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.complianceweek.com/top-minds/ben-bard-crusader-of-compliance/2305.article
[https://perma.cc/6VSS-9DC5].
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sophisticated technology. Investigations and discipline are not only resource
intensive but may also cause discomfort and hurt feelings if executed poorly.
One has to be deft in doling out punishment while simultaneously
maintaining the loyalty of the target’s peers. The individual who takes the
reins of a corporation’s compliance function must possess the ability to
command resources and material support from the company’s highest
authority. The CCO can tout her organization as a “solutions provider” all
she wants. She still needs management’s support and the financial outlay
necessary to monitor the workplace.
Accordingly, within the firm, it is reasonable to presume that elite CCOs
can more easily command resources and respect than homegrown CCOs
(those who came up the firm’s ranks) or those with experience who
nevertheless boast less impressive credentials. First, to the extent that board
members and high-level officers consider themselves elite, they are likely to
accord more respect to their peers.94 Second, and perhaps more importantly,
the elite CCO enjoys an important source of bargaining power: her ability to
walk away if the board fails to invest in the compliance program’s activities.
If the CCO is herself elite, she maintains the ability to walk away from the
job precisely because her resume makes her attractive to competitor firms.
Her future prospects are not tied up solely in the firm.95 If corporate
management rejects or ignores her requests for resources, the elite CCO can
more easily find another job elsewhere. Indeed, she can do so rather noisily,
attracting the attention of the press, activist investors, or government
investigators. Aware of this dynamic, the company’s highest level
management will more likely accede to the CCO’s demands for resources.
To the extent the CCO’s interests are aligned with that of the company’s
owners and the general public (i.e., that she is not just engaging in empire
building), this ability to credibly threaten exit enhances the compliance
function’s size and power and thereby improves social welfare.
C. Signaling
The recruitment of an elite attorney to helm the firm’s compliance
organization emits potent internal and external signals. Within the firm, the
CCO’s arrival affirms to its rank-and-file employees that corporate
management is committed to improving its compliance effort. That, in turn,
improves morale among those inclined to follow the law and potentially
induces broader and earlier internal whistleblowing. The company is able to
detect and remediate wrongdoing sooner and more effectively because its

94. See, e.g., Woodson, supra note 18, at 208.
95. By contrast, someone who has been with the firm for years may be more tied to the
firm and unable to leave. For more on firm-specific investments in human capital and the
ways in which those investments hinder employee exit, see Urska Velikonja, The Cost of
Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 1918–20 (2013) (observing that an employee
who has built capital with the firm cannot easily switch jobs when she learns of the employer’s
fraud).
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employees accept and internalize management’s claim that it desires a
compliant company.
By the same token, the elite CCO’s hiring conveys important information
to those situated outside the firm. An elite CCO, particularly one with a
background in federal regulation or enforcement, improves the firm’s
reputation among regulators, corporate watchdogs, potential investors, and
other groups. This reputational benefit instills a degree of trust in
government regulators and prosecutors that might not otherwise exist. Trust,
in turn, smooths the way for the government to exchange leniency for
voluntary reporting.96
III. PERFORMANCE BLIND SPOTS
Part II laid out the benefits that accrue to firms when they hire elite
attorneys to oversee their compliance functions. Elite actors improve
compliance by contributing their knowledge and talents, by securing
resources, and by authenticating the organization’s bona fides to internal and
external stakeholders.
This Part constructs a theory of “performance blind spots.” Part III.A
begins by exploring the already recognized relationship between
performance and noncompliance. Part III.B hypothesizes why elite CCOs
may be pathologically blind to the compliance risks posed by certain types
of performance regimes.
A. Performance and Noncompliance
Why do people lie and cheat? Questions like these have long preoccupied
behavioral ethicists, deterrence theorists, and criminologists.97 Some
individuals opportunistically prey on others, luring unsuspecting victims into
fraudulent schemes and absconding with their money. In employment
settings, the explanation for wrongdoing is often more nuanced. Some
individuals may be opportunistic, but many others commit wrongdoing
because they feel pressured by their respective organizations to meet certain
performance targets.98 In other words, they break laws not because they
96. See Baer, supra note 72, at 326 (explaining how trust facilitates the exchange of
voluntary disclosure for prosecutorial leniency).
97. For the seminal application of rational choice theory to criminal law, see generally
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)
(offering the first modern formal model articulating economic theory premised on a costbenefit analysis) and A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and
Discounting of Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1999)
(refining earlier deterrence models by examining the declining disutility of punishment, as
well as an individual’s tendency to discount disutility in future time periods). See also Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195–98
(1985) (constructing the “market bypass” theory, whereby offenders violate the law in order
to evade the discipline of markets).
98. See Sally S. Simpson & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Low Self-Control, Organizational
Theory, and Corporate Crime, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 510 (2002) (citing “firms that set
unreasonable goals and then punish managers who fail create [sic] a climate of pressure and
fear among employees, leading to ‘innovative’ solutions when objectives are not met”).
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enjoy doing so but because they feel they have no other choice.99 When the
probability of detection appears low and the costs of missing performance
targets appear high, employees will break rules, and sometimes laws.100
To put it another way: most employees might prefer to meet a firm’s
performance targets authentically, through their own effort and ingenuity.
When authentic performance appears impossible, however, some employees
will resort to rule breaking and, eventually, lawbreaking. And once they
resort to lawbreaking, these employees will find it very difficult to stop what
they are doing because cessation of fraudulent activities often accelerates the
detection of previous fraudulent activity.101 Moreover, once some employees
decide to substitute rule breaking for authentic performance, other employees
may come to the conclusion that they too have no choice but to break various
rules, just to keep up with their peers.
By definition, all performance regimes create some residual risk of
lawbreaking. Any professor who has administered a final exam or graded a
set of term papers understands this dynamic; many students do their own
work, but a few will cheat or otherwise violate academic rules. For that
reason, schools deploy a number of tools to deter and identify academic
dishonesty such as plagiarism.102 Schools employ exam proctors, encourage
professors to utilize plagiarism-detection software, and implement honor
codes among student bodies.103 Moreover, they advise in student handbooks
of the severe consequences of engaging in academic dishonesty and devise
complex procedures for addressing claims of dishonesty and meting out
discipline.104
99. Armour et al., supra note 29, at 18–19 (explaining how performance metrics can drive
risky or noncompliance behavior among employees who feel pressured to meet the company’s
goals). For a recitation of rationalizations employees use to justify their illegal behavior, see
generally Todd Haugh, Sentencing the Why of White-Collar Crime, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3143
(2014). See also EUGENE SOLTES, WHY THEY DO IT: INSIDE THE MIND OF THE WHITE-COLLAR
CRIMINAL 6–7 (2016) (concluding that white-collar offenders engage in crimes because they
are too distanced from the abstract and “amorphous” harms they impose on others through
their financial manipulations).
100. See Velikonja, supra note 95, at 1919–20.
101. See generally Miriam Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA.
L. REV. 1295 (2008) (explaining the “linkage” between initial instances of fraud and continued
fraudulent behavior); Velikonja, supra note 95, at 1924 (affirming that “fraud begets more
fraud”).
102. “As a student, plagiarism is a cardinal offense, punishable by expulsion under even
the barest student honor codes.” Andrew M. Carter, The Case for Plagiarism, 9 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 531, 534 (2019) (citing penalties for law students).
103. See Lori A. Roberts & Monica M. Todd, Let’s Be Honest About Law School Cheating:
A Low-Tech Solution for a High-Tech Problem, 52 AKRON L. REV. 1155, 1156–57 (2018)
(describing efforts of “professors and educational administrators scrambling to keep up with
the tech-savvy world of academic dishonesty” in law school settings and combat academic
dishonesty with the assistance of technology). For a comprehensive analysis of academic
dishonesty in undergraduate settings as well as the approaches most likely to succeed, see
DONALD L. MCCABE, KENNETH D. BUTTERFIELD & LINDA K. TREVINO, CHEATING IN COLLEGE:
WHY STUDENTS DO IT AND WHAT EDUCATORS CAN DO ABOUT IT (2012).
104. For an early discussion advocating the procedures institutions of higher learning
should adopt, see generally Curtis Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to
Fair Processes for the University Student, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 289 (1999).

2020]

COMPLIANCE ELITES

1619

Workplaces are, in some respects, analogous to academic settings.105
Much like a university requiring a minimum grade point average, supervisors
and managers communicate performance targets to their employees, and
these targets, in turn, form the basis for remuneration and promotion. For
simplicity, I refer to these goal-setting systems as “performance regimes.” In
a meritocracy, performance regimes serve as an objective basis by which to
sort and distribute benefits to employees.106 When performance is both
authentic and properly evaluated, a performance-based metric improves
social welfare by allocating resources efficiently within the firm and doing
so in a way that participants are likely to respect as legitimate.107 We would
much prefer a firm to dole out benefits and rewards according to performance
as opposed to some other basis, such as race, gender, or social status.108
All performance regimes present some risk of cheating, however, and this
in turn undermines their efficacy and legitimacy. Managerial researchers
refer to this as the “goals gone wild” problem.109 Some metrics pose more
risks of cheating than others. In a private sector firm, the compliance officer
ought to be attuned to these risks.
For example, unrealistic targets are problematic in that they set employees
up to fail. If authentic performance is impossible or extremely difficult to
achieve, employees will search for substitutes—including illegal behavior—
and they will rationalize this behavior as “necessary” or “deserved” because
the firm has saddled them with the obligation to achieve such unrealistic
targets.110
105. On the ways in which corporate compliance might learn from academic dishonesty
research, see Maurice Stucke, In Search of Effective Ethics & Compliance Programs, 39 J.
CORP. L. 769, 819–20 (2014) (describing different approaches to detecting cheating in the law
school context and how that might inform corporate compliance efforts).
106. Admittedly, some may view the “concept of merit” as mostly myth. See, e.g., Hilary
Sommerlad, The “Social Magic” of Merit: Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion in the English
and Welsh Legal Profession, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2325, 2326 (2015).
107. This claim admittedly oversimplifies the vast literature on incentives within firms.
For example, because of a dynamic often described as the “motivational crowding-out effect,”
even relatively plausible rules can induce antisocial behavior in that they cause a decision
maker to view the decision through a cost-benefit frame, and not through an ethical one. For
an excellent overview of the literature describing this effect, see Kristen Underhill, Money
That Costs Too Much: Regulatory Financial Incentives, 94 IND. L.J. 1109, 1121–23 (2019).
108. The firm could instead compensate its employees primarily on the basis of the
employee’s seniority within the firm. Although these metrics are more common in the public
sector, scholars have suggested them in lieu of incentive schemes. See Lynn A. Stout, Killing
Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences of “Pay for Performance,” 39 J.
CORP. L. 525, 536 (2014) (questioning the “wisdom” of ex ante performance incentives).
109. See Lisa D. Ordóñez et al., Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of
Overprescribing Goal Setting, 23 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 6, 7 (2009). But see Edwin A. Locke
& Gary P. Latham, Has Goal Setting Gone Wild, or Have Its Attackers Abandoned Good
Scholarship?, 23 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 17, 17 (2009) (dismissing the article as based primarily
on anecdote and poor causal reasoning).
110. On rationalizations generally, see Todd Haugh, Harmonizing Governance, Risk
Management, and Compliance Through the Paradigm of Behavioral Ethics Risk, 21 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 873, 892 (2019). See also Adam Barsky, Investigating the Effects of Moral
Disengagement and Participation on Unethical Work Behavior, 104 J. BUS. ETHICS 59, 60
(2011) (describing research explicating an employee’s “selective activation or disengagement
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Many of the behaviors that feature heavily in familiar stories of corporate
wrongdoing can be traced to unrealistic and unforgiving performance
regimes. To meet ambitious cost-savings mandates, employees cut corners,
including those related to safety;111 they exaggerate sales at the end of a
reporting period in order to meet overly aggressive targets;112 and they bribe
government officials (domestic or foreign) to meet quick production
schedules.113 To be sure, employees might engage in this conduct anyway to
get ahead of their peers. The presence and framing of the firm’s performance
expectations, however, can drastically increase the risk of the frequency and
severity with which misconduct occurs.
Performance regimes can also induce distortive behavior when they rely
on arbitrary cutoffs. Well-documented distortions in financial reporting
demonstrate the difficulties that inhere when employees are judged and paid
not just on the basis of their qualitative performance but instead primarily on
quantitative factors that incorporate relatively arbitrary temporal or
When employee treatment is “sensitive” to
geographic cutoffs.114
quantitative targets, employees will “manage” their numbers in order to meet
their targets.115 That is, they will distort their underlying activity and distort

of self-sanctions” in regard to unethical conduct); Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 23, at
227–28.
111. David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill Is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental
Crime, and the Criminal Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1420–28 (2011) (describing the
Deepwater Horizon explosion and factors that produced it); see also GARRETT, supra note 58,
at 117–21 (analyzing BP’s safety lapses at its Texas City refinery, which led to an explosion
and multiple deaths and injuries in 2005).
112. The Wells Fargo scandal of a few years ago falls within this category, as did Sears’s
auto center scandals of the early 1990s. In both instances, pressure on employees to drive
company profits led to fraudulent practices. See June Carbone, Naomi Cahn & Nancy Levit,
Women, Rule-Breaking, and the Triple Bind, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1151 (2019)
(discussing pressure on employees to engage in fraudulent practices such as opening new
accounts without the customer’s knowledge or consent); W. Robert Thomas, Incapacitating
Criminal Corporations, 72 VAND. L. REV. 905, 908 (2019) (“Wells Fargo did not require its
employees to break federal banking law, but it did make it virtually impossible for them to
keep their jobs unless they did.”); see also Lynne L. Dallas, Preliminary Inquiry into the
Responsibility of the Corporation and Their Officers, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 39–40 (2003)
(describing the ill effects of “placing unrealistic expectations on employees and threatening
them with dire personal consequences for not meeting certain ends”).
113. See, e.g., Sharpe, supra note 9, at 1330 (describing evidence of Walmart’s Mexican
subsidiary’s illegal payments to Mexican authorities, which reportedly were intended to allow
it to build more stores and “expand more quickly” throughout Mexico); Press Release, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Medical Manufacturer Settles Accounting Fraud Charges (Sept. 28,
2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-178 [https://perma.cc/6K7W-EZTE]
(describing a Massachusetts-based medical company’s accounting fraud and improper
payments to foreign officials in order to drive sales and meet revenue targets).
114. “[I]ncentive pay has been statistically linked with opportunistic, unethical, and even
illegal executive behavior, including earning manipulations, accounting frauds, and excessive
risk-taking.” Stout, supra note 108, at 534.
115. The inverse is also true. See Dain C. Donelson & Christopher G. Yust, Litigation Risk
and Agency Costs: Evidence from Nevada Corporate Law, 57 J.L. & ECON. 747, 771 (2014)
(“If managers are able to otherwise extract value from the corporation without needing to meet
earnings targets, reporting positive earnings performance becomes relatively less important,
so it is not surprising that earnings management would decrease.”).
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the manner by which they report such activity through the firm’s reporting
channels.116 Moreover, if judged solely on the performance of their own
divisions, divisional and regional managers will always seek to optimize the
performance of their own units, even if those decisions threaten long-term
harm to the firm.117 These distortions represent a deadweight loss to the firm;
they waste the employee’s time, mislead her managers, and increase the
threat that a relatively minor distortion today will eventually snowball into
material fraud tomorrow.118
Finally, employers who build too much variance into their measurement
regimes—that is, by creating a major difference in how employees are treated
depending on whether they meet, exceed, or just miss a given target—further
risk illegal behavior. Employees who fall just short of a profitability target
and who know that falling short will be met with a demotion, a reduction in
salary, or termination will be far more incentivized to engage in misconduct
than employees who face far less severe consequences.
B. Strategies for Mitigating Performance-Related Misconduct
One takeaway from the foregoing discussion might be to relax
performance requirements or judge employees according to more prosocial
metrics, such as their seniority and experience, their degree of effort, and
their ability and willingness to collaborate.119 Whatever the merits of this
approach, it seems unlikely to displace more quantitative factors, at least
within the private sector. “Goals gone wild” may be a problem, but few
would seriously propose the firm’s elimination of all quantitative or objective
goals.
Ideally, an effective compliance program would aid the firm in mitigating
and avoiding the worst consequences of performance regimes. Readers will
note that this requires a mix of ex ante and ex post protections. Ex ante, a
firm’s CCO should guide supervisors away from unrealistic targets, arbitrary
cutoffs, and overly draconian regimes that tolerate disproportionate variance
between different degrees of performance. If management pushes back, a
CCO who recognizes the risks inherent in certain performance regimes can
also build in additional oversight structures to reduce misconduct risk. For
example, if the CCO is aware that a division within the firm has implemented
a particularly unforgiving performance requirement, the CCO can direct
additional monitoring resources to that division to ensure reported outcomes
116. “[G]oals and quotas—commonplace in many phases of a business—can distort
judgment especially when the goal is close but still out of reach.” Donald C. Langevoort,
Behavioral Ethics, Behavioral Compliance, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME
AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING, supra note 72, at 267.
117. “A divisional manager typically seeks to maximize the reported profitability of her
own business unit, not necessarily the value of her firm as a whole.” Daniel A. Crane,
Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675, 696 (2010).
118. See generally Velikonja, supra note 95.
119. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD
PEOPLE (2011) (criticizing pay-for-performance regimes and arguing for a prosocial approach
to corporate governance).
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really are as positive and genuine as supervisors claim. Performance regimes
may cause cheating, but the firm can protect itself by erecting heightened
monitoring programs to deter and address such cheating.
Ex post, a firm’s CCO and deputies must be adept at recognizing the red
flags of inauthentic performance, or what one might call “too good to be true”
performance.120 When an employee’s group or division manages to beat all
targets, month after month, year after year, the firm must verify that rosy
reports reflect legitimate performance and are not the product of illegal
behavior. An effective CCO will coax higher-level managers and board
members to review positive reports more critically, invest in more frequent
and robust internal monitoring systems, take whistleblowing reports more
seriously, and embrace additional tools adept at detecting violations of law.
Finally, the CCO must ensure that a proper system of monitoring,
discipline, and internal norms exist sufficient to: (a) deter employees from
violating policies and laws and (b) induce law-abiding employee-witnesses
to report violations to the firm’s internal compliance authorities. The system
will likely rely on a mix of formal rules and sanctions, as well as informal
cultural and organizational influences.
Thus, the typical CCO must skillfully engage in several tasks at the same
time. She needs to flag performance regimes that introduce too much risk;
protect certain regimes with additional oversight mechanisms; examine with
a skeptical eye actual performance that is potentially the result of bad
behavior; and put in place the formal and informal mechanisms that keep the
residual risk of wrongdoing to a minimum. And finally, our intrepid CCO
must also implement and update mechanisms designed to test the efficacy of
the tools and systems she has embraced to carry out these tasks.
Were one to summarize the foregoing strategies, one might rank them in
terms of preference. For example, Table 1 might express many readers’
intuitions in that it assumes that it is best to avoid overly risky performance
regimes in the first place.
Table 1: Three Strategies for Reducing Performance-Related Misconduct
First Best Option
Dismantle overly
risky performance
regimes.

Second Best Option
Protect riskier
regimes with greater
monitoring and
oversight.

Third Best Option
Identify and
discipline “too good
to be true”
performance.

Table 1 also illuminates several practical underpinnings of the longstanding debate over “deterrence” and “integrity” approaches to compliance.
A program that focuses more on the second and third strategies (oversight
and discipline) by definition looks far more like the kinds of programs that
120. Langevoort, supra note 116, at 268 (“[W]hen we observe some person or team hitting
‘stretch’ goals period after period, it should be a compliance red flag, not just the cause for
celebration and reward payouts that it is in so many firms.”).
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rely on conventional deterrence mechanisms. A program that seeks to
dismantle overly draconian performance regimes and implement programs
less sensitive to quantitative performance will often be deemed the more
“values oriented” approach.
The foregoing labels, however, oversimplify the challenge of reducing
wrongdoing within the firm. A firm that unilaterally disables its objective
performance metrics risks losing its access to capital as well as its human
talent. Moreover, a CCO who joins a firm that is a going concern must also
take into account the costs—to the firm, and to her own department’s
mission—of dismantling the policies and structures that precede her.
Accordingly, the pragmatic CCO will likely choose a mix of the three
strategies, relying in part on past practice, interpersonal dynamics, and the
extent to which a given performance regime appears particularly risk-laden
compared to others.
C. Constructing a Theory of Performance Blind Spots
Scholars have already cited a wealth of structural and behavioral factors
that undermine the CCO’s efforts to implement an effective compliance
program. As noted earlier, Bazerman and Tenbrunsel’s work explains that
ethics programs underperform because individuals often fail to recognize the
unethicality of their own behavior.121 Corporate governance scholars, by
contrast, focus on incentive mismatches. John Armour, Jeffrey Gordon, and
Geeyoung Min have demonstrated ways in which stock-based compensation
induces corporate managers to overvalue short-term profits and shortchange
longer-term investments in compliance.122 Donald C. Langevoort and others
have shown how cognitive errors and biases undermine the robust monitoring
envisioned by regulators and prosecutors.123 Legal ethicists, in turn, focus
even more attention on attorney-specific biases and heuristics, such as loyalty
and conformity.124
These critiques omit an additional variable: the background of the
individual occupying the CCO’s position. It may matter who occupies that
position, and it may further be the case that an elite background undermines
her ability to recognize the problems with the performance regimes outlined
in Part III.B. To that end, the elite CCO behaves very much like the person
121. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 23, at 126 (“Although organizational efforts
to create systems that improve members’ ethical behavior are often well intentioned,
psychological processes limit the effectiveness of such solutions.”). Indeed, “sanctioning
systems” can, in some circumstances, induce more wrongdoing because they increase the
probability “that the behavior will be evaluated [by employees] via a cost-benefit analysis
rather than on its ethicality.” Id. at 127.
122. Armour et al., supra note 29, at 5.
123. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of
Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71.
124. For an early and major discussion on this topic, see Kim, supra note 22, at 998–99,
1019–24 (describing loyalty and conformity pressures that lead inside corporate counsel to
deliver suboptimal gatekeeping). See also Paula Schaefer, Behavioral Legal Ethics Lessons
for Corporate Counsel, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 975, 984–1000 (2019) (describing biases and
heuristics that affect corporate attorneys in their representation of corporate clients).
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who fails to perceive her ethical weaknesses.125 The issue is not that the
CCO lacks a moral valence or holds the wrong values. Rather, it is that she
is bounded in her ability to recognize what is and is not a dangerous
performance regime. And the reason she is bounded in this recognition is
that she herself has bested many performance regimes over the course of her
career.
Readers will recall from Part II that there exist many good reasons to
embrace an elite CCO, particularly one who hails from outside the firm. The
same qualities that make the elite CCO an excellent hire, however, may also
set her up for failure. The elite CCO is, by definition, a top performer. To
rise to that level, she has bested a series of performance challenges on
multiple occasions. Moreover, she is also likely an outsider. After all, the
firm that wishes to signal that it is turning over a new leaf, will seek not only
a “legal elite” but also someone who bears no taint from the previous scandal.
As a result, the firm will forgo the opportunity to promote someone (perhaps
with a less elite background) from within. The elite CCO’s outsider status
carries reputational value, but it simultaneously aggravates the CCO’s blind
spots.
Imagine a brand new CCO confronts a series of performance targets upon
entering the firm. Which ones merit the closest attention, and which ones
deserve to be shelved immediately? If the firm is emerging from a scandal,
the worst systems may be obvious to everyone. Beyond this, however,
reasonable people will differ. It will be the CCO’s responsibility to tread
carefully but thoroughly in determining which additional performance goals
merit a closer look, and it may not be the goal itself that is the problem. It
may be how the firm measures the goal, how it compensates (or punishes)
performance aimed at achieving said goal, or how quickly it expects its
employees to meet its goal that induce different degrees of misconduct.126
It is within this ambiguous gray zone that performance blind spots are most
likely to emerge and do their damage. Absent blunt evidence to the contrary,
someone who has repeatedly scored in the top percentiles nationally on
standardized tests; who has then followed up that performance by scoring at
the top of a law school’s grading curve; and who has bested many of her
competitors in series of workplace mini tournaments might not find a series
of severe or unforgiving performance targets problematic. By the same
token, someone who has routinely lived with arbitrary cutoffs (such as the
cutoffs state bar associations routinely put in place for test takers) or high125. When an individual is unaware of her ethical failings, we say that she suffers “bounded
ethicality.” Due to psychological processes (including rationalizations for the underlying
behavior) the person deludes herself in such a way that she remains unaware that she is
behaving unethically and therefore sees no inconsistency between her conduct and her desire
to behave like a morally upright person. See FELDMAN, supra note 24, at 50–53 (describing
research).
126. Armour et al., supra note 29, at 18 (explaining that “the compliance implications of
performance targets are a joint function of the definition of the targets themselves and the
intensity of the financial incentives—in terms of rewards (penalties) for meeting (missing)
targets”).
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variance tests (evidenced by exams such as the LSAT and SAT) may not be
as quick to look skeptically on regimes that promise high-variance
consequences for employees who fall just short of a predefined goal. And
finally, someone who has authentically performed at the top of her game—
for quite some time—might not be as skeptical of a high-level manager’s
performance that, in other contexts, might be adjudged “too good to be true.”
Now, one might argue in response that the academic context could just as
easily train academic high achievers to become superior monitors insofar as
they have witnessed dishonesty caused by the academic version of “goals
gone wild.” After all, we know cheating occurs frequently throughout
institutions of higher learning.127 Perhaps elite lawyers have learned and
benefited from witnessing such episodes? Just as an Olympian knows some
of her competitors use illegal performance-enhancing drugs, so too might a
compliance elite realize that some of her competitors have violated academic
rules. Knowledge of cheating throughout academia ought to improve the
elite compliance officer’s oversight throughout workplace settings.
The foregoing assumes, however, that academic institutions are
transparent about their students’ bouts with dishonesty. Most academics
would conclude the opposite. For a mix of reasons, institutions of higher
learning tend to favor opacity in their responses to academic dishonesty.
Cheating scandals imply both that the students are less able than advertised
and that the universities lack adequate internal controls. Reputational costs,
student privacy concerns, and the desire to head off expensive litigation
collectively encourage a culture of silence among academic administrators.
Professors may be aware of cases of plagiarism that they themselves have
cited, but their institutions will almost certainly channel those cases to
academic discipline committees, whose processes and determinations are
purposely kept obscure and divorced from scrutiny.128
Only when instances of cheating become so severe that they blow up into
pressworthy scandals will they finally penetrate the public psyche.129 And
in those circumstances, the specific facts will lead the institutions in question
to minimize the conduct as rogue behavior, unrepresentative of the rest of the
institution (or motivate rival institutions to insist that the cheating is limited
to just a single competitor). Accordingly, unless a high-performing student
is personally aware of academic dishonesty (because, for example, she
directly witnessed it), she is likely to underestimate the extent to which harsh
or high-stakes grading schemes fuel antisocial behavior. To the contrary, she
127. See, e.g., Angela D. Miller, Tamera B. Murdock & Morgan M. Grotewiel, Addressing
Academic Dishonesty Among the Highest Achievers, 56 THEORY INTO PRACTICE 121 (2017).
128. Alan Hamlin et al., A Comparison of University Efforts to Contain Academic
Dishonesty, 16 J. LEGAL ETHICAL & REG. ISSUES 35, 45 (2013) (concluding that universities
apply their policies inconsistently and “do not share information on offenses and offenders”
that can be easily retrieved, compared, or analyzed).
129. See, e.g., Marc Tracy, College Sports 101: A U.N.C. Class Reviews a Scandal at Its
Source, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/04/sports/uncscandal.html [https://perma.cc/X4CL-77] (describing the 2014 discovery that UNC Chapel
Hill had offered hundreds of athletes credit for “fraudulent classes” that either required very
little or no work at all).
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may simply assume that tough grading schemes bring out the best in all of us
and allocate rewards in a rational, welfare-increasing manner.
Accordingly, for the elite CCO, her prior performance functions as a kind
of cognitive blind spot. Her long history of successfully navigating highstakes tests fails to alert her to the risk of misconduct inherent in certain types
of goal-setting behavior. As a result, she fails to identify risky compensation
policies or argue forcefully enough for their alteration. She fails to recognize
the need for additional oversight and monitoring for the programs that remain
in place. And she is less skeptical of too-good-to-be-true performance,
particularly among employees and divisions that have already been
designated “hot shots” by their peers. To be sure, much of this likely happens
at the margin. Given enough information, a CCO can and may eventually
overcome her blind spot. But the delay in recognizing a problem is often key
to preventing it, or at least preventing it early enough from becoming a
catastrophe.
D. Objections
The hypothesis I have laid out is just that. One would need empirical
research to support the claims I make in the preceding sections. Apart from
a lack of empirical data, one might further object that the model fails to take
into account those studies that have found that cognitive mistakes affect
lawyers and clients differently.130 By the same token, we also know that we
often judge our own performance differently from the performance of others.
Thus, the positive light we attach to our own motivations or actions ought to
disappear when we judge someone else’s motivations or actions.131
But performance differs in important ways from motivation. The
argument here is that the elite CCO will judge the firm’s performance targets
with rose-colored lenses because she encountered hurdles long ago over
which she triumphed with hard work and ingenuity. Thus, she will discount
the likelihood that undeserving colleagues will fall short, view the regimes
as unfair, or most importantly, gravitate towards distortive and illegal
conduct. It is not the colleagues’ motivations that she will misjudge; rather,
she will misjudge the regimes under which they have been expected to
perform because she once bested regimes of similar severity.132
Having approved or acquiesced in these performance regimes, the CCO
subsequently will be less inclined to question “good performance” because
questioning someone’s good performance would be tantamount to
questioning an earlier determination that a given goal or set of goals was
130. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Stephan Tontrup, Does the Endowment Effect Justify
Legal Intervention?: The Debiasing Effect of Legal Institutions, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 143 (2015)
(reporting the results of an experiment where the principal-agent relationship effectively
reduced the endowment effect).
131. For more on this “holier than thou” viewpoint, see Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The
Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and
Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1185–86 (2010).
132. See FELDMAN, supra note 24, at 39 (“[P]eople do not just react to their current
situation; much of their behavior is related to experiences in previous situations.”).
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reasonable. Moreover, it would cast the CCO’s personal, historical narrative
in an uncomfortable light. She herself would no longer be the beneficiary of
a “tough but fair” testing regime (or in reality, series of regimes). Instead,
she would be the winner of a high-stakes game that was known to generate
cheaters and market distortions among her peers.
Thus, the performance blind spot emanates from how the elite CCO
conceptualizes her own success. She fails to recognize the weaknesses in a
hypermotivated performance regime because to do so would be to question
the very types of regimes that eased her ascendance into an ever-narrowing
pool of elites. Viewed from that lens, the performance blind spot is a coping
mechanism, and it should sound familiar to those who study cognitive
dissonance and self-serving biases.133 To avoid the discomfort that arises
when inconvenient facts challenge one’s embedded belief systems, one
ignores or reshapes the evidence at hand.134
Motivated reasoning135 can be dangerous in any setting, but for the elite
CCO navigating a complex and sophisticated corporation, it is doubly
problematic. First, the CCO underestimates the misconduct risk inherent in
a series of performance regimes. Then, the CCO ignores red flags relating to
one or more units’ miraculous performance. Eventually, distortive conduct
coalesces into a scheme that inexorably collapses under its own weight.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COMPLIANCE-SEEKING FIRM
As Part III explains, the performance blind spot is a problem of perception.
It extends not simply to one’s behavior but to the performance and goalsetting systems one has been asked to evaluate. Historical success in one
domain instigates blindness in another. To the elite CCO, systems that
routinely assess, reward, and punish the company’s employees will seem
more innocuous, more virtuous, and more accurate than they should,
precisely because the elite CCO flourished under similar regimes.
Performance blind spots represent an important theoretical contribution to
the study of corporate compliance. First, they focus greater attention on the
compliance function’s chief officer, as well as her background. Second, they
demonstrate the incompleteness of the structural debate that currently
preoccupies corporate compliance scholars. The issue is not simply one of
integrating or separating the firm’s compliance function from its legal
department. Firms will seek “elite” compliance officers regardless of
133. See id. (explaining that self-serving biases “are usually interpreted as aligning reality
with people’s self-interest”); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?: A Behavioral
Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75, 102–03 (1993)
(explaining the cognitive processes that lead someone to reject information that conflicts with
previously held attitudes or beliefs).
134. Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias for
Independent Auditing, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1597, 1617 (2000) (explaining cognitive dissonance
as “the tendency of people to reduce or avoid psychological inconsistencies”).
135. On motivated reasoning, see David Yokum, Christopher T. Robertson & Matt Palmer,
The Inability to Self-Diagnose Bias, 96 DENV. L. REV. 869, 901 (2019) (“Substantial research
indicates that people are motivated to perceive themselves in a positive light.”).
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whether they choose a standalone compliance department or one integrated
with the rest of the firm. And if an elite CCO suffers performance blind
spots, it is difficult to imagine how those blind spots will fall away if she
happens to direct a standalone function or one nested within the company’s
legal department. Either way, the blind spots will impair her ability to
identify risky performance regimes.
What, then, is the answer to this problem, assuming we agree it is a
problem? The answer is not that boards and managers should cease the hiring
of elite lawyers into jobs that require a keen understanding of the psychology
of dishonesty. Not only is this prescription implausible but it would be highly
counterproductive. As Part II established, elite lawyers enjoy many desirable
qualities, not the least of which is their talent and deep expertise. Although
corporate boards may overvalue elite credentials (particularly in comparison
to other soft qualities), it is hardly irrational to treat stints in Big Law or
federal enforcement agencies as useful proxies for high legal acumen and
commitment to hard work.
Drawing on the cognitive bias literature, one might conclude that the best
way to approach the problem is to address and mediate it. Although the socalled perfect remedy lies far beyond this project’s scope, I touch on three
possibilities below.
First, the debiasing literature might offer some help in disarming the CCO
of her performance blind spots. When a decision maker’s decisions are
colored by biases and heuristics, legal regimes can respond either by
insulating an organization from such “boundedly rational” decision-making,
or “by operating directly on the boundedly rational behavior and attempting
to help people either to reduce or to eliminate it.”136 The latter approach is
of course the debiasing approach. One could imagine a series of
presentations or even interactive exercises designed to debias the CCO of her
belief that high-stakes performance regimes always bring out the best in their
participants. Perhaps, when confronted with such evidence, the CCO would
become more skeptical of performance regimes and more willing to question
instances of superlative performance.
Debiasing strategies, however, have been met with limited success in other
contexts, in part because relapse is common. Moreover, a debiasing strategy
may be of less help in curing an actor of a given blind spot than other biases
or heuristics.137 If the reason an elite embraces a high-stakes performance
regime is bound up with the CCO’s personal narrative (“I was tested this way
and I did just fine!”), then that elite may encounter difficulty backing away
from this narrative, even when confronted with corrective information.
136. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199,
200 (2006). As Feldman points out, debiasing studies that rely on experimental settings may
not translate so well into real-life situations, particularly where individuals prefer not “to be
made aware of the implications of their behavior.” FELDMAN, supra note 24, at 92 (describing
the drawbacks of debiasing strategies).
137. See generally Daniel Pi, Francesco Parisi & Barbara Luppi, Biasing, Debiasing, and
the Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 143 (Eyal
Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014).
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That brings us to a second option, namely the use of artificial intelligence
tools to manage risk. Scholars have already begun to analyze the ways in
which artificial intelligence is likely to alter compliance metrics,138 corporate
legal advice,139 and the workplace itself.140 Would a risk-evaluation tool
enable the CCO to move past her performance blind spots? Perhaps, but
insofar as the tool would require analysis on the front and back ends, it is
impossible to say that machine learning will protect the company from its
employees’ cognitive failures. So long as (human) elites continue to play
major decision-making roles in firms, so too will their biases and heuristics.
Thus, although we might welcome an artificial intelligence tool designed to
catch overly risky performance metrics, we ought not to rely too heavily on
it, as it is bound to fail so long as humans play a role in administering it.
That brings us to the third option, the seniority approach, which is the most
simplistic of the three but also the one most easily implemented: corporate
boards and elite CCOs should pay close attention to lower-level compliance
personnel who have been employees for a comparatively long time. That is,
they should be sure not to undervalue the lower-level compliance officer’s
seniority and tenure. Those who have been with the company for a long time
may be tainted by recent scandals and demoralized by previous supervisors.
Their resumes may be less objectively impressive than that of the elite CCO.
They will, however, have a better sense of how various incentive schemes
have affected the workplace. That is, their experience may help the elite
CCO overcome her performance blind spots.
Thus, the performance blind spot may explain why it is that corporate
boards and corporate CCO’s should value seniority among mid- and lowerlevel compliance managers. The elite CCO may bring needed respect to the
compliance function, but it will be the compliance department’s long-term
members who best understand the threats embedded in the company’s
performance regimes.
CONCLUSION
This piece opened by citing a notable compliance failure that produced the
subsequent hiring of an elite CCO. The elite CCO exists in certain quarters
and will continue to exist so long as compliance remains a priority for
regulators, prosecutors, and corporate management. Boards rightfully
purchase elite credentials for their internal and external signaling powers. A
robust network of law firms, enforcement agencies, and consulting
companies are just as intently developing the skill sets of a new crop of
would-be CCOs. These attorneys are poised to take the reins of numerous
138. Laufer, supra note 42, at 418–20.
139. See generally Milan Markovic, Rise of the Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325
(2019).
140. Firms may prefer to replace individuals with machines insofar as machines are less
prone to driving up the firm’s compliance costs. See Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do
After Work?: Automation and Employment Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 291 (2018) (observing
that firms can tamp down compliance-related costs by replacing employees with automation).
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companies’ compliance functions and fashion them into highly effective
programs. Some will succeed in this endeavor. Others may not be so
fortunate. Indeed, if the elite CCOs who are emerging today fail to recognize
and confront their unique biases, they may finally experience something that
they have been fortunate enough to avoid for most of their lives: failure.

